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“You have two homes your entire life. This planet Earth and your body.” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Nothing says tragedy like selling your family’s 100-year-old farm.2 Doug
Martin had to sell his farm because he could not maintain access to enough
groundwater after an influx of groundwater regulations in 2014. 3 Unfortunately,
he is not the only farmer selling his farmland due to groundwater depletion.4 Over
the next twenty years, lack of adequate groundwater conservation efforts could
reduce California’s farmland by half a million acres. 5
California’s small farmers will try to sell their land if the wells run dry—which
happens when groundwater extraction occurs faster than groundwater can fully
recharge.6 Regulating groundwater is similar to preserving funds in a bank
account.7 Account supply problems arise when the rate of withdrawals surpasses
the amount deposited.8 The number of small farms in California will continue to
dwindle without greater incentives to recharge groundwater. 9
Chapter 678 attempts to address groundwater depletion by creating a five-year

1. Email from Rachel Salcido, Professor of Law, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, to
Aliya Gorelick, Staff Writer, University of the Pacific Law Review, University of the Pacific McGeorge School
of Law (Mar. 6, 2020, 10:07 PDT) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. See Kerry Klein, California Water Cutbacks Could Take Large Area of Farmland Out of Production,
NPR (Dec. 26, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/26/791560787/california-water-cutbacks-couldtake-large-area-of-farmland-out-of-production (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (selling his
land out of fear regarding new groundwater regulations that limit groundwater extraction for farm use).
3. See id. (limiting groundwater extractions, Mr. Martin would not be able to extract enough water to grow
crops and raise cattle).
4. See Dale Kasler, More California Farmland Could Vanish as Water Shortages Loom Beyond Drought,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 26, 2015, 9:14 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/water-anddrought/article46665960.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (competing for groundwater
means only those farmers will larger pumps “to get more groundwater than their neighbors” will survive the new
regulations).
5. Telephone Interview with Mark Arax, Author of The Dreamt Land (June 24, 2020) (notes on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review); Klein, supra note 2.
6.
See
Overuse,
GROUNDWATER
FOUND.,
https://www.groundwater.org/getinformed/groundwater/overuse.html (last visited May 20, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (depleting groundwater without recharge means there will not be sufficient water for farmers because all
the available groundwater was already utilized).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Kasler, supra note 4 (recharging groundwater is one way to keep smaller farms afloat by providing
adequate water for farmers to maintain their land and cattle).
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permit and a five-year change order to recharge groundwater basins with surface
water.10 However, Chapter 678 will not incentivize recharge because it only
authorizes irregular groundwater recharge—during flash floods or heavy rainfall
occurring in wet seasons.11 The five-year permit will not result in sufficient
groundwater recharge without a mechanism to incentivize year-round groundwater
recharge.12 Chapter 678 falls short unless the Legislature implements a
groundwater trading market to account for dry-season recharge.13
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Farmland will fade away if groundwater is inaccessible during dry years. 14
Groundwater recharge is a method of storing water in the ground, which is
especially useful during dry years.15 Acquiring a permit to divert surface water to
groundwater basins is the first step in conducting wet season groundwater
recharge.16 Section A explains California’s urgency to recharge groundwater
through the executive order calling for expedited recharge efforts. 17 Section B
discusses the temporary and permanent groundwater recharge permits available
under existing law.18 Section C examines the nuance that prevents California law
10. See AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (issuing a conditional temporary permit and
change order for five-year authorization to divert surface water during high-flow events to underground storage).
11. See id. (permitting only wet season recharge instead of allowing recharge during dry seasons when
farmers need water most and neglecting to allow water conservation during dry years through qualifying wet
season recharge only for a beneficial use).
12. See WATER § 113 (“sustainable groundwater management is best achieved locally through the
development, implementation, and updating of plans and programs based on the best available science.”); AB
658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (recognizing the need for groundwater recharge but preventing a
realistic solution by not allowing dry season recharge).
13. See generally Groundwater Trading as a Tool for Implementing California’s Sustainable Groundwater
Management
Act,
ENVTL.
DEF. FUND
(last
visited
July
8,
2020),
available
at
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/water-markets.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (describing how short and long-term leases and water exchanges could be used as dry-season
recharge options).
14. See Kasler, supra note 4 (“Experts at UC Davis estimated that farmers have been draining the valley’s
underground water reserves by as much as 5 million acre-feet per year during the drought to help compensate for
staggering shortfalls in water deliveries from the State Water Project and the federal government’s Central Valley
Project”.
15. See Lori Pottinger, Storing Water for Dry Days, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://www.ppic.org/blog/storing-water-dry-days/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining that the primary storage source for droughts is from groundwater and that every year California’s
droughts continue to get worse).
16. See AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (recharging requires getting a permit to recharge
for beneficial use and subsequent recharge into basins during heavy rainfall or flash floods).
17. SGMA Implementation: Water Rights Permitting Options for Groundwater Recharge Projects,
MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK (Feb. 20, 2020), https://mavensnotebook.com/2020/02/20/sgma-implementation-waterrights-permitting-options-for-groundwater-recharge-projects/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review); infra Section II.A.
18. Infra Section II.B; see MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK, supra note 17 (“there are certain times of the year or
seasons where available surface water can be diverted for groundwater replenishment, and . . . there should be
permanent permitting tools to be able to do that.”).
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from qualifying groundwater recharge as a beneficial use under the beneficial use
doctrine—thereby limiting the amount of water that can legally be recharged into
a groundwater basin.19
A. California Needs Groundwater Now
The increase in groundwater recharge permit regulations in California is in
response to decades of unregulated groundwater pumping from wells.20
Groundwater recharge regulations recognize that the current free-for-all,
unregulated groundwater extraction system is unsustainable. 21 The extraction
system is especially unsustainable because porous rocks beneath the earth’s
surface lose the ability to store water when groundwater over-pumping occurs.22
When the ground loses the ability to store water, there is no backup supply when
surface water depletes completely.23
The urgency for long-term groundwater sustainability stems from California’s
growing reliance on groundwater.24 Subsection 1 highlights the executive order
that paved the way for Chapter 678.25 Subsection 2 introduces the large-scale
framework of recharge regulations through the Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act (“SGMA”). 26
B. State of Emergency
Due to severe drought conditions in 2014, Former California Governor Jerry
Brown issued an executive order declaring a state of emergency. 27 Then and now,
19. Infra Section II.C.
20. See Klein, supra note 2 (“For decades, Californians have been sucking far more out of underground
aquifers than rain, snow, rivers or canals could put back in.”).
21. See Julia Sullivan, Agricultural Land Retirement in the San Joaquin Valley: A Novel Conservation
Opportunity, YALE ENVTL. REV. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://environment-review.yale.edu/agricultural-landretirement-san-joaquin-valley-novel-conservation-opportunity (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (describing the water resources in the San Joaquin Valley as “overtaxed”).
22. See Renee Cho, The Growing Groundwater Crisis, EARTH INST. (Aug. 3, 2015),
https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2015/08/03/the-growing-groundwater-crisis/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (describing how rocks depleted of groundwater may never again reach levels of
sustainability).
23. See id. (describing how water drops when the groundwater is completely depleted).
24. See All About Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, NGO GROUNDWATER COLLABORATIVE,
http://cagroundwater.org/?page_id=25 (last visited June 18, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (“overdraft led to groundwater subsidence of several feet in some parts of the state, and the drying up of
more than 1500 wells in Tulare County (accounting for more than half of dry wells in the state), leaving thousands
of Californians without water from their tap.”).
25. Infra Subsection II.A.1.
26. Infra Subsection II.A.2; see Tina C. Leahy, Comment, Desperate Times Call for Sensible Measures:
The Making of The California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVTL. L.J.
5, 8 (2015).
27. Cal. Governor’s Exec. Order No. B-36-15 (Nov. 13, 2015).
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harsh drought conditions and water shortages present a continuing threat to
Californians’ safety.28 The executive order sought to encourage a statewide
recharge effort targeting the feasibility of recharge groundwater basins. 29
California authorized the State Water Resources Control Board to accelerate
approval for groundwater recharge projects during high-precipitation events.30
High-precipitation events—primarily occurring during wet seasons—range from
heavy rainfall to flash flood events.31
Groundwater recharge happens when water seeps through the ground to
replenish the water supply in groundwater basins.32 Basins are large spaces where
water pools for storage.33 Through recharging groundwater basins, groundwater
storage provides an essential water supply and a solution for providing safe and
reliable well water. 34 Additionally, keeping water in storage ensures the
availability of adequate water supplies during severe drought conditions.35
Maintaining groundwater storage is necessary to ensure water supply availability
for future droughts.36
1. Paving the Way to Sustainable Groundwater Management: The SGMA
The SGMA sets requirements for groundwater basin managers to address
groundwater depletion by setting goals to recharge groundwater. 37 Chapter 678 is
distinct from the SGMA but intends to work in tandem with the SGMA to
encourage groundwater recharge efforts. 38 Assembly Member Joaquin
Arambula—author of Chapter 678—said Chapter 678 seeks to advance the
SGMA’s sustainability goal.39
28. Id.; Pottinger, supra note 15.
29. Cal. Governor’s Exec. Order, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. See id. (minimizing flood risks is the result of recharging groundwater using “available high water
flows”).
32. Leahy, supra note 26.
33. Id.
34. Cal. Governor’s Exec. Order, supra note 27.
35. Cal. Governor’s Exec. Order, supra note 27; see Pottinger, supra note 15 (“California has always relied
on water storage, and in droughts today we rely on it even more.”).
36. See Pottinger, supra note 15 (“Surface storage in reservoirs is very important in the first couple years
of a drought, but with longer droughts we rely more and more on groundwater storage.”).
37. See Craig A. Carnes Jr., California’s Historic Groundwater Legislation: The Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act, 17 NO. 1 ABA WATER RES. COMM. NEWSL. 11, 12 (2015) (meaning returning the basin to a
sustainable yield, where the amount of water extracted is less than the amount of water replenished into the basin).
38. See AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (“It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this
measure to encourage groundwater recharge projects during times of high-flow events by creating a temporary
five-year permit and a temporary five-year change order administered by the State Water Resources Control
Board.”); Carnes, supra note 37 (“The state, through the California State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) may intervene in the management of a groundwater basin.”).
39. See Telephone Interview with Joaquin Arambula, Assembly Member and Author of Chapter 678,
Fresno Cnty. (June 17, 2020) (notes on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (advocating for AB
658 as helping close a gap in water rights permits for groundwater recharge); MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK, supra note
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The SGMA’s sustainability goal is to replenish the groundwater supply to keep
groundwater basin storage intact. 40 By maintaining groundwater basins’ ability to
store water, there is a substantial chance of having water supplies during extreme
drought conditions.41 Achieving the SGMA’s sustainability goal requires acquiring
permits to divert surface water to groundwater storage to recharge the basins. 42
2. No Middle Ground: Permits under Existing Law
Existing law provides temporary permits and change orders to divert surface
water to groundwater basins.43 A temporary permit is necessary when a permit
applicant does not yet possess a legal right to surface water. 44 A change order is
appropriate for an applicant seeking to transform an existing legal water right to a
water right that permits conducting groundwater recharge . 45 Existing law provides
a 180-day temporary permit, a 180-day temporary change order, and a standard
permit.46
While the 180-day permit is not a long-term solution, the standard permit
provides permanent authorization to divert surface water for recharge. 47 Unlike the
180-day permit, the standard permit takes years to process. 48 Although permanent
authorization through the standard permit takes years to process, the investment is
worthwhile for conducting long-term groundwater recharge projects. 49
C. The Beneficial Use Doctrine and the Obstacles it Poses to Sustainable
Groundwater Management
Before an applicant obtains a permit to divert surface water to recharge
groundwater basins, the surface water needs to have an apparent and beneficial
use.50 Under California law, the beneficial use doctrine says that water rights
17 (providing a bridge between shorter temporary permits and the standard permit for surface water diversion to
groundwater storage).
40. See Carnes, supra note 37 (prioritizing action towards sustainability in California’s “critically overdrafted groundwater basins”).
41. Pottinger, supra note 15.
42. Carnes, supra note 37; Arambula, supra note 39.
43. MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK, supra note 17.
44. See id. (“In order to issue the permit, the Division of Water Rights must make a number of findings,
including that the applicant has an urgent need for the water.”).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (permitting renewal for a subsequent 180-day period).
48. See id. (encouraging investing capital into recharge projects because senior water rights will always
prevail over temporary permit water rights).
49. See CAL. WATER CODE § 22263 (West 2020) (explaining the first in time, first in right principle in
California water law is a system that ensures water rights have seniority when obtained earlier than subsequent
water rights).
50. Matt Weiser, Why California Law Requires a ‘Clear Benefit’ for Groundwater Recharge, WATER
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holders must have a reason to extract groundwater before they divert surface water
to groundwater basins.51 For example, the stored water’s beneficial use could be
the future extractive use of irrigating crops.52 Erik Ekdahl—the deputy director at
the State Water Resources Control Board—explained the fear is that people will
hoard large amounts of water.53 Upstream water rights holders taking unlimited
amounts of water threatens downstream users’ access to water. 54 Thus, the
beneficial use doctrine requires a beneficial use for groundwater before approving
a permit to divert surface water for groundwater recharge. 55 Unfortunately,
groundwater recharge alone—for the sake of maintaining groundwater storage
ability—is not a beneficial use according to California law. 56
III. CHAPTER 678
Chapter 678 creates a five-year temporary permit and a five-year temporary
change order for surface water diversion to groundwater for recharging the
basins.57 Permits and change orders provide the right to divert surface water to
groundwater storage for a temporary five-year period.58 Chapter 678 does not alter
the requirement that a person must have a beneficial use for groundwater before
diverting surface water for recharge. 59 Local agencies and groundwater basin
managers are encouraged to apply for Chapter 678’s permits to work toward
groundwater sustainability.60
Further, Chapter 678 mandates that surface water diversion can only occur if
it does not negatively affect water quality.61 The five-year permit and change order
only authorize a person to divert surface water to groundwater recharge during
high-flow events.62 High-flow events include heavy rainfall or flash floods and
occur irregularly during wet seasons. 63 Diverting excess water during high-flow
DEEPLY (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/science/1933122/why-california-law-requires-a-clear-benefitfor-groundwater-recharge (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
51. Id. (illustrating that surface water becomes groundwater when it reaches the basin and the prerequisite
to diverting surface water is to have a designated use for the groundwater once it is put into the ground).
52. See id. (“The applicant would have to specifically target some ancillary benefit of recharge, such as
salinity control in an aquifer or reversing land subsidence caused by over-pumping groundwater.”).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Weiser, supra note 50.
57. AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (intending to provide temporary permits to conduct
groundwater recharge projects when rainfall or flash flooding increase the amount of water in a river creating
excess water—more water than the river normally holds due to the rainfall or flash flooding).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (“The proposed change may be made without
injury to any other lawful user of water, including the water user’s ability to meet water quality objectives.”).
62. Id.
63. Id. (“The proposed diversion to underground storage will occur only when flow in the source waterbody
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events is permissible through the temporary permits.64 Chapter 678 approves
diverting excess water from high-flow events for groundwater recharge. 65
The high-flow event requirement attempts to prevent injustice against existing
water rights by not giving duplicative water rights. 66 Moreover, diverting surface
water to groundwater storage must not negatively impact downstream water
quality.67 Downstream water quality assessments consist of monitoring water
users’ self-reports regarding recharge quantities. 68 The surface water diversion
must also leave enough water volume in the water source to sustain fish and
wildlife habitats.69 These conditions ensure that surface water diversion occurs
solely through diverting excess water without causing damage to water users or
the water source itself. 70
The five-year temporary permit aims to promote groundwater recharge by
giving a longer option between the existing 180-day temporary permit and the
existing standard permit. 71 A permit holder immediately loses their water rights
when a temporary permit expires. 72 Renewals of 180-day temporary permit
applications are not guaranteed.73 Additionally, the standard permit application
takes years to process. 74 Therefore, the five-year temporary permit fills the gap
between the existing permit options so applicants can maintain water rights while
applying for standard permits.75

exceeds the claims of all known legal users who divert water downstream of the proposed point of diversion.”).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (illustrating that water rights holders own every drop
of water in the water source and that diverting excess water when there is heavy rainfall means that water rights
holders claim to the amount of water typically in the water source remains unaffected when the excess water is
authorized for diversion to recharge).
67. Id.
68. See id. (locating the point of diversion is the geographical point where redirection of the natural course
of river flow occurs).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020); Hearing on AB 658 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Water, Parks, and Wildlife, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
72. See MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK, supra note 17 (explaining that the permit does not automatically renew and
the applicant must submit an application to renew the permit).
73. See id. (showing that the five-year permit is ideal because an applicant will not have to renew their
permit as often as with the 180-day permit).
74. Id.
75. See id. (intending the five-year permit “to be a bridge between temporary and permanent water rights”).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Groundwater recharge is a reliable method of preserving water in groundwater
basins for use during dry years.76 Without constant recharge, porous rocks in the
ground lose their ability to store water causing infrastructure damage and an
unreliable water supply.77 That loss is significant because approximately 33% of
California’s residents depend on groundwater as a primary water supply source. 78
Also, 40% of California’s water supply comes from groundwater in a normal year,
and 60% comes from groundwater during dry years. 79 Section A explains that
Chapter 678 does not go far enough because it does not account for dry-season
recharge.80 Section B discusses why groundwater trading markets are ideal for
incentivizing for dry-season recharge.81 Section C shows that a groundwater
trading market—in conjunction with Chapter 678—should maintain a sustainable
groundwater supply to last throughout drought conditions.82
A. Chapter 678 Is Not Good Enough Because It Does Not Account for DrySeason Recharge
Assembly Member Arambula said the law seeks to provide farmers with an
opportunity to store water during wet seasons.83 Chapter 678’s high-flow
requirement makes certain that groundwater recharge can only occur solely
through diverting excess water. 84 Water sources experience high-flow during
heavy rainfall and flash flood events.85 For example, if a river typically carries 500acre-feet of water and substantial rainfall increases that amount to 800-acre-feet,
300-acre-feet is excess.86 Accordingly, Chapter 678 does not provide groundwater
recharge opportunities during dry seasons.87

76. See Leahy, supra note 26 (recharging groundwater during dry years is a reliable method of preserving
water because it is practical to save for water depletion for future droughts).
77. See Cho, supra note 22 (describing how rocks depleted of groundwater may never again reach levels
of sustainability).
78. Joyia Emard, California Marks Key Step Toward Achieving Sustainable Groundwater Management,
CAL. DEP’T WATER RES. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://water.ca.gov/News/News-Releases/2020/CA-Marks-Key-StepToward-Achieving-Sustainable-Groundwater-Management (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
79. Id.
80. Infra Section IV.A.
81. Infra Section IV.B.
82. Infra Section IV.C.
83. See Arambula, supra note 39 (explaining that Californians need to take advantage of wet years to better
prepare for future droughts).
84. AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020).
85. See id. (using the term high-flow to describe when the source waterbody exceeds its normal amount
and diversion of excess water will not disadvantage other water users).
86. See id. (illustrating that the 300-acre-feet in excess can be diverted from surface water to groundwater
recharge for a beneficial use).
87. See AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (prohibiting surface water diversion to
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Prolonged drought conditions and surface water depletion in dry years indicate
California’s future dependence on plentiful groundwater supplies. 88 On the
surface, creating a five-year temporary permit incentivizes investments in
groundwater recharge. 89 However, groundwater recharge through Chapter 678 will
not have a substantial impact because the law only authorizes recharge during
high-flow events—which occur during wet seasons.90 Chapter 678 would be more
effective if it permitted recharge during wet seasons and dry seasons, instead of
only wet seasons.91
Wet-season groundwater recharge laws are insufficient because high-flow
events may only occur every five to seven years. 92 Due to infrequent and
unpredictable high-flow events, the opportunities for permittees to divert surface
water to groundwater basins for recharge under Chapter 678 are slim. 93 Dry-season
recharge, on the other hand, encourages sustainable groundwater management
whereby farmers can save water for future droughts during both wet seasons and
dry seasons.94
Wet-season recharge alone through Chapter 678 does not adequately remedy
groundwater depletion because the water will be subject to use when the five-year
permit expires.95 Additionally, the beneficial use requirement poses the risk of
permittees losing water rights if the beneficial use is not exercised in a reasonable

groundwater recharge absent excess flow in the source waterbody and allowing temporary recharge opportunities
when there is excess water from high-flow events); Pottinger, supra note 15 (warning that dry drought seasons
will increases in length and wet seasons will decrease because of the warming climate).
88. See Emard, supra note 78 (“Groundwater acts as a drought buffer by providing water that is available
to use when surface water supplies are diminished” and “groundwater storage will become even more important
as California’s changing climate produces less snow and more rain.”); see also Pottinger, supra note 15
(“California has a very long dry season, which is when we use most of our water, and a fairly short wet season,
when we try to gather and store water.”).
89. See Kasler, supra note 4 (giving farmers the false impression that they can cope with the new
groundwater legislation by recharging during dry years); see also Arambula, supra note 39 (explaining that
Chapter 678 only provides an opportunity to recharge during wet seasons with excess water in the water source).
90. See AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (allowing only recharge projects to divert surface
water for groundwater recharge during heavy rainfall or flash flood events). Contra Pottinger, supra note 15
(explaining the need for groundwater recharge in wet seasons and dry seasons is to combat more extended drought
periods).
91. See AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (allowing only recharge projects during wet
seasons). Contra Pottinger, supra note 15 (emphasizing the need to utilize water storage in dry seasons as well as
wet seasons).
92. ELLEN HANAK & ELIZABETH STRYJEWSKI, CALIFORNIA’S WATER MARKET, BY THE NUMBERS
UPDATE 2 (Public Policy Institute of California, 2012) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
93. See id. (“During the eight-year period from 1987 to 1994, California experienced only one ‘normal’
precipitation year (1993); five of the remaining seven dry years were deemed ‘critically dry.’”).
94. See generally AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (neglecting to consider dry-season
recharge). Contra Pottinger, supra note 15 (urging California to seriously consider recharging during dry seasons
to prepare for drought conditions).
95. See AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (authorizing water diversion until the permit
automatically expires five years after permit authorization); Weiser, supra note 50 (disallowing water to stay in
the ground once it is put there because it must constitute a supply for another use that is deemed beneficial).
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amount of time because of the Legislature’s fear of water hoarding.96 Wet-season
recharge alone does not create water use opportunities during dry years since the
water must have a further extractive beneficial use. 97 With the limited ability to
keep water in the ground, the difficulty of adequately storing wet season recharge
water for dry years increases exponentially.98 Therefore, Chapter 678 fails to
account for California needing dry season recharge to achieve a reliable
groundwater supply to last throughout drought conditions.99
B. A Groundwater Trading Market Can Account for Dry-Season Recharge
A groundwater trading market would promote sustainable groundwater
management in conjunction with Chapter 678 by providing recharge opportunities
throughout wet and dry seasons.100 Recharging in wet and dry seasons requires a
regulatory system that can punish detrimental water hoarding.101 Subsection 1
explains how groundwater trading markets foster investments in dry-season
recharge.102 Subsection 2 explains why California should follow Australia’s model
for a groundwater trading market.103
1. How Groundwater Trading Markets Account for Dry-Season Recharge
Groundwater recharge is not considered a beneficial use because the
Legislature fears it will encourage “cold storage.”104 Cold storage occurs when
water rights holders store unlimited amounts of water for recharge.105 Taking too
much water into cold storage affects the availability and cost of water to

96. See Weiser, supra note 50 (fearing creating more buyers in the market, suggesting it would create a
greater monopoly for water than already exists). But see AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020)
(requiring the recharge water to have a separate beneficial use, including an extractive use like irrigation).
97. See Weiser, supra note 50 (losing water rights is a result of nonuse of allocated water). But see WATER
§ 1433.1 (advocating for recharge projects that can only happen in wet seasons).
98. See Weiser, supra note 50 (“The problem is that groundwater recharge by itself is not considered a
‘beneficial use’ under state law, and meeting that definition is a requirement to obtain a permit to divert water.”);
see also AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (requiring that recharge water has an ancillary beneficial
use aside from the actual recharge itself).
99. See Pottinger, supra note 15 (explaining that California “often lack[s] enough water to get good
recharge”); see also AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (failing to authorize dry season recharge
because of the flawed belief that recharging in wet seasons alone is sufficient to maintain California’s groundwater
supply throughout drought years).
100. See Pottinger, supra note 15 (highlighting the need to recharge during wet seasons and dry seasons
because the dry seasons will get longer with the warming climate). But see AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess.
(Cal. 2020) (allowing recharge only during high-flow events that occur during wet seasons); ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
supra note 13 (outlining sustainable practices include recharging to the greatest extent to prepare for dry years).
101. HANAK & STRYJEWSKI, supra note 92; ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13.
102. Infra Subsection IV.B.1.
103. Infra Subsection IV.B.2.
104. Weiser, supra note 50.
105. Id.

483

2021 / Could a Trading Market Encourage Year-Round Sustainable Groundwater
Management
downstream users.106 The Legislature cannot confidently allow groundwater
recharge to be a non-extractive beneficial use without a system of enforcement.107
A groundwater trading market would monitor upstream users’ water allocations
and transactions to ensure no one abuses recharge opportunities. 108
Groundwater trading creates an annual water leasing and trading system
through monitoring of well water extractions.109 Water trading markets are
property rights management systems that allow trading between users. 110 Water
trading creates a voluntary trading system to reallocate water resources. 111
Groundwater trading markets operate as gatekeepers for recharge by providing
monetary incentives to keep water in the ground for storage during dry seasons. 112
During dry seasons, no surface water is available to put into the ground. 113 Dryseason recharge occurs by extracting less water instead of using the total amount
of allocated water. 114 Using less water means the water can remain in the ground,
thereby recharging the groundwater basin. 115 Trading markets bypass the
beneficial use requirement by permitting groundwater rights to be transferable. 116
Transferable rights ensure recharge water has an ancillary beneficial use. 117
Because Chapter 678 only permits wet-season recharge, a trading market for dryseason recharge will result in adequate groundwater supplies to mitigate the global
water crisis.118
106. Id.
107. See id. (fearing lack of enforcement will encourage senior water rights holders to partake in cold
storage).
108. See id. (explaining the need for something to bypass the beneficial use requirement because the
legislature has no intention of making recharge a beneficial use).
109. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13.
110. Sarah Wheeler, Understanding Participation in Murray-Darling Basin Water Markets: A
Comparison of the Southern and Northern Basins, GLOBAL WATER FORUM (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://globalwaterforum.org/2020/03/10/understanding-participation-in-murray-darling-basin-water-markets-acomparison-of-the-southern-and-northern-basins/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
111. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13.
112. See Pottinger, supra note 15 (explaining that dry season recharge requires a “better accounting system
to improve incentives”); see also ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (detailing the need for dry year recharge
preparations). But see AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (West 2020) (focusing only on wet-season
recharge).
113. See generally ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13.
114. See generally ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (explaining short and long-term leases and water
exchanges are dry-season recharge options). But see AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (specifying
recharge options only for high-flow events).
115. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13.
116. See generally ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (advocating for voluntary trading and water
reallocation to ensure sustainable groundwater recharge). But see AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020)
(focusing on recharge without considering transferable water rights through recharge).
117. See Weiser, supra note 50 (requiring an added benefit from storing water); see also ENVTL. DEF.
FUND, supra note 13 (leasing and trading groundwater to accommodate higher value needs ensures there will be
a beneficial use for the water).
118. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (“If individuals understand that they can be rewarded and
compensated for implementing water-saving strategies, it should help smooth the transition to sustainable
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2. Australia’s Groundwater Trading Market is a Model California Should
Follow
California’s current water allocation system encourages using every ounce of
water.119 A water market, with annual groundwater leasing, provides farmers the
flexibility to buy groundwater to support their farms. 120 Farmers could buy water
from neighbors when wet-season recharge or surface water is unavailable.121
Disseminating water resources encourages farmers to be water conscious by
monitoring pumping levels to lease and buy water. 122 The inability to trade,
transfer, or sell groundwater highlights the insufficiencies in California’s current
groundwater system.123 A groundwater market incentivizes dry-season recharge by
giving parties the ability to buy, sell, and trade groundwater depending on need.124
Dry-season recharge occurs through fewer groundwater extractions because the
seller must extract less water to conduct water trading for profit. 125 California
should look to Australia’s model for a thriving groundwater trading market
because Australia’s groundwater market is active and sees fewer groundwater
extractions.126
Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin groundwater market’s success is mainly due
to the inclusion of transferable rights, enforceable limits, and reliable databases. 127
Australia’s groundwater trading market helps users identify the best water use
through databases that function as gatekeepers for groundwater recharge
transfers.128 Water rights transferability in Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin
groundwater governance.”).
119. See Alastair Bland, A New Groundwater Market Emerges in California. Are More on the Way, NEWS
DEEPLY (June 22, 2018), https://www.newsdeeply.com/water/articles/2018/06/22/a-new-groundwater-marketemerges-in-california-are-more-on-the-way (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A ‘use-itor-lose-it’ system of water allocation has historically required growers in California to irrigate their land or lose
their water rights, whether market forces compelled them to grow crops or not.”).
120. See id. (meaning that farmers would not have to sell their farms due to lack of water because of the
availability to purchase groundwater from their neighbors).
121. See id. (incentivizing farmers to buy water from neighbors if they believe their groundwater use will
be curtailed by new groundwater legislation).
122. See id. (describing California’s success with surface water transactions to suggest that groundwater
trading could incentivize groundwater sustainability just like surface water trading emphasizes surface water
sustainability).
123. See Chris Austin, Groundwater Market: A case study of the Fox Canyon Groundwater Market,
MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK (Nov. 20, 2019), https://mavensnotebook.com/2019/11/20/groundwater-markets-a-casestudy-of-the-fox-canyon-groundwater-market/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A
groundwater trading market is a . . . cap and trade scheme where the cap is represented by the sustainable yield
or the total amount of pumping that can be allowed in the basin, and the trading happens at the allocation level
between individual water users.”).
124. Id.
125. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (trading groundwater deals with pumping allocations rather
than physically conveying the groundwater).
126. Wheeler, supra note 110.
127. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (trading programs must monitor, enforce, verify, and maintain
a groundwater rights database as well as set rules for water allocations to succeed).
128. Wheeler, supra note 110.
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encourages diversity in water usage leading to less frivolous use.129 Achieving
fewer groundwater extractions from farms happens with crop diversity because
farmers will invest in crops that can survive with less water. 130 Farmers have a
monetary incentive to invest in low-water crops with a system that allows water
rights transfers.131
A groundwater market would directly benefit California’s farmers in the
Central Valley by allowing water reallocation based on the water volume crops
require.132 A groundwater trading system will supplement Chapter 678’s
shortcomings for failing to permit dry-season recharge.133 Australia’s thriving
groundwater trading market is a model that California should follow to promote
recharge in conjunction with Chapter 678.134
C. A Groundwater Trading Market in Conjunction with Chapter 678: A Hopeful
Promise of Sustainable Groundwater Maintenance
Wet-season recharge alone is insufficient to ensure a plentiful groundwater
supply to use during drought conditions.135 Since California’s droughts worsen
every year, wet- and dry-season recharge must exist simultaneously to maintain a
decent groundwater supply.136 Extended drought periods in California highlight
the need to employ wet- and dry-season recharge to maintain a portion of Earth’s
water storage ability.137 With longer dry seasons and shorter wet seasons, wetseason recharge will not produce enough water for long-term sustainable
recharge.138
Chapter 678 provides an avenue for wet-season recharge but does not provide
129. Id.
130. See id. (creating a robust and sophisticated trading system that will incentivize fewer groundwater
extractions requires “variability of water extractions across time and space by industry” to facilitate greater
participation in water trading).
131. See id. (facilitating water trading requires diversifying crops and investing in low water crops to
encourage robust participation, otherwise industries remain the dominant players).
132. See Ellen Hanak & Jelena Jezdimirovic, Water Marketing That Helps Nature, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL.
(Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.ppic.org/blog/water-marketing-that-helps-nature/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (improving water trading conditions will reduce conflicts about allocation over scarce water
supplies) .
133. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (providing an avenue to conduct dry season recharge—
extracting less groundwater—for the beneficial use of groundwater trading itself).
134. See Austin, supra note 123 (showing California has the capacity to start a groundwater trading
market); Wheeler, supra note 110 (detailing Australia’s groundwater markets’ success by providing transferable
rights with monetary incentives for using less water); ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (outlining California’s
need for a reliable groundwater trading market). But see AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (West
2020) (neglecting to acknowledge the need for a groundwater trading system and silent on dry-season recharge).
135. Pottinger, supra note 15.
136. Id.
137. See id. (“California has 400-500 million acre-feet in groundwater storage” which is the primary water
storage for use during drought conditions).
138. Id.
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an avenue for dry-season recharge. 139 A groundwater trading market encourages
dry-season recharge by incentivizing decreased groundwater extractions. 140
Without the element of compensation—inherent to a groundwater trading
market—groundwater basin managers and farmers will not invest in groundwater
recharge.141 A groundwater trading market also promotes Chapter 678 by
providing monetary incentives for wet-season recharge.142 With a thriving
groundwater trading market, farmers like Doug Martin might not need to sell their
farms prematurely.143
Increasing incentives for dry-season recharge also increases wet-season
recharge since parties can capitalize on year-round trading in the groundwater
market.144 Dry-season recharge requires storing water from initial water supplies
by extracting less water.145 However, wet-season recharge operates with surplus
water from high-flow events.146 Profiting from dry-season recharge incentivizes
using Chapter 678 to increase profitability in wet seasons.147 A groundwater
trading market and Chapter 678 will work together to incentivize wet- and dryseason recharge to maintain groundwater storage and increase sustainable
groundwater management.148 Stimulating recharge in wet and dry seasons will
provide a more reliable groundwater supply for use throughout drought
conditions.149

139. AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020).
140. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (giving farmers the option to sell groundwater instead of extract
will foster a “gradual decrease of allocation over time, helping users adjust to pumping reductions that may be
necessary to achieve sustainability”).
141. See Arax, supra note 5 (“The solution is not to get rid of extraction, but the extraction needs to be
reinvented” to level the playing field between people who can afford water and people who can afford to conserve
water).
142. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (promoting dry-season recharge as a means to increase wetseason recharge); see also AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (intending to promote recharge during
wet seasons without an adequate incentive).
143. See Klein, supra note 2 (losing water accessibility for farmland also reduces property value and “there
is a point where you’ve got to fold them and run”).
144. See Wheeler, supra note 110 (showing the benefits of creating an incentive-based recharge initiative
through a groundwater trading market).
145. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13.
146. Id.
147. See id. (creating a groundwater trading market with monetary incentives promotes inter-annual
flexibility thereby encouraging pumping less in drought years or switching water sources depending on
availability).
148. Id.; AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020).
149. See Pottinger, supra note 15 (“Almost all the water people use in summer has been stored someplace,
either in a reservoir or groundwater” in California and “you need three things to recharge groundwater: porous
land above an aquifer, enough water available above that land, and enough empty space under that land to store
it.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
A groundwater trading market will support farmers in dry seasons by allowing
sellers to reallocate water supplies through annual leases. 150 California’s current
water market only contains buyers due to fear that allowing sellers into the market
will incentivize water hoarding.151 Groundwater trading markets protect against
cold storage and water hoarding while encouraging dry- and wet-season
recharge.152 Long-term sustainable groundwater management and conservation
requires a market that freely allows people to recharge during dry and wet
seasons.153
On its own, Chapter 678 is an insufficient groundwater recharge law. 154
Chapter 678 would be more effective if it did not have a restriction for recharge
solely during wet seasons.155 Additionally, achieving meaningful progress towards
sustainable groundwater management can only happen with an incentive for wetand dry-season recharge.156 A groundwater trading market is the best way to
facilitate and account for dry-season recharge. 157 Therefore, unless the Legislature
implements a groundwater trading market to account for dry-season recharge,
Chapter 678 will fall short and fail to address California’s groundwater shortage.158

150. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (“Water trading has been an important water management tool
in California for decades, which has helped agricultural, municipal, industrial, and environmental uses alike.”).
151. Id.
152. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13.
153. See id. (trading groundwater will help groundwater basins reach a sustainable yield—“the maximum
quantity of water . . . that can be withdrawn annually from a groundwater supply without causing an undesirable
result”).
154. See AB 658, 2020 Leg., 2019-2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (West 2020) (permitting only wet-season
recharge—during high-flow events—without permitting dry-season recharge will not secure an adequate
groundwater supply to help groundwater basins reach a sustainable yield and reliable water supply for droughts).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Pottinger, supra note 15 (“To improve recharge locally, we need a better accounting system to
improve incentives.”).
158. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 (“Trading enhances a range of options available to groundwater
users” that will diversity crops and engage market participants by incentivizing water conservation, while slowly
ramping-down annual groundwater extraction levels).
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